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African Art: 
What and to Whom? 
Anxieties, Cetainties, Mythologies 
It has taken nearly a whole century to publish two books on 
African art that recognize the continent as a complex cultural unitwithiJI 
which there is diversity, A History of Art in AfriCil (Blackmun Visona, M 
et al, 2(01) and Africa, The Art of a Continent (phillips, T. 1995). Why 
it taken so long far North and East Africa past and present to be 
in texts labeled African art? Why were they not recognized as Afticilll?, 
lodia, also a place of diversity of race and ethnicity, has not 
similarly treated. The assumptions underlying the norms 
a representation of Africa were deeply rooted, their influence 
scholarship related to African art and culture was profound and, eVeII 
if attenuated at present, persistent. They have impacted on 
organization of information related to Africa, influencing from 
cataloging, the content of texts and videos, to museum layout 
exhibitions. Only by becoming conscious of the pervasive power 
this "hidden curriculum" can we take steps to counter its 
Those underlying assumptions are symptomatic of European fear5aJlII 
desires related to Aftican identity. 
Why has that anxiety persisted for so long, and what has 
it to wane so that finally these texts could appear? What ideologial 
and other forces were at work that determined the pace of 
What "new" dilemmas are replacing, or being added to (com~lliClltiDI 
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.,I)sCUrlng, weakening) the old? Are the old dilemmas taking new 
{ortIlS? What is the Significance of such questions and their possible 
answers to art education? 
Early Anthropology, Race, 
IJId Europe's Modem Anxiety over Africa 
The European anxiety over Amcan identity was generated by its 
lftO(iem colonial and oppressive relationship to Afticans in the old and 
JIj!W worlds. The need to construct European identity as essentially 
SUperior to allothers was so powerful that it was imperative to remove 
IJIY suggestion of civilizing influence of Afticans or any other on 
European culture; and divest Africans generally, but black Africans 
particularly; of individuality and reflexivity. This is why Oiop's (1974) 
userti0n of an African origin of civilization, and Bernal's (1988) 
Cl)lllention that modern historiography has been thoroughly penetrated 
and compromised by racism and continental chauvinism is deeply 
dlsturbing to the academic status quo. 
If 1 am right in urging the overlhrow of the Aryan Model and its 
rep/Jlcement Uy tire Revised Ancienl one, it will be 1recessary not only to 
rethink tire fundamental bases of 'Weslern Ciuili2lltinn' but also to 
recognize the penetration of racism and 'continental dzauvinism' into 
all our historiography, or philosophy of writing history. The Ancient 
Model had no major 'interna/' deficiencies, or weaknesses in exp/Jlnatory 
power. Ih",,}; overthroum for external reasol/S. For 18" · and 19"'-century 
Rmlzanhcs and racists it was simply intolerable for Greece, which was 
seen nol merely as the epitome of Europe but alw as its pure childhood, 
to have been tire result of a mixture of native Europeal/S and colonizing 
Africans and Semites. Therefore, the Ancient Model/tad to be overthrown 
and replaced Uy something more acceptable. (Italics in the original 
p.2) , 
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Even scholars such as Wallis Budge (1973), who regarded ancient Egypt 
as essentially an African culture, made sure that his readers understoOd 
that it was inferior to Greece and Europe. 
In order to acrueve the second imperative Egypt and North Africa 
had to be culturally and racially removed from any influence or relation 
to black Africa. Here the science of Anthropology was pivotal in that it 
devised the categories of race. There is little doubt today that the racial 
categories of the nineteenth and early twentieth century anthropologists 
were conceived to legitimate the racial and ethnic apartheid hierarchies 
that imperial European powers needed to affirm their superiority (Diop, 
1974, Bernal, 1988.). African culture identified with Negroes, pagan 
religions, and "tribes: could be distinguished from North African 
cultures identified with Hamites and Semites. Its religions could be 
distinguished from world religions, especially monotheistic ones, Islam. 
Christianity, and Judaism. Its cultures were regarded as primitive rather 
than civilized and developed. In the racial hierarchy that prevailed blaci 
Africans, categorized as Negroes, were at the bottom of the ladder, 
correlated inevitably with "the masses," intuitiveness, the collectivr 
unconscious. The majority of European scholars were persuaded by 
the "objectivity" of the convenient racial categories erected by early 
anthropological "science." The most civilized black person 
nevertheless beneath the most uncivilized white person. Comt,ined: 
with gender hierarchy this placed black women on the lowest rung 
humanity. Altogether the black person stood precariously above 
category of higher animals such as apes. As this was a structure 
to serve Europe's imperial ambitions nothing in it anticipated the'impad 
of "Negro" African visual-manipulative forms on European arbistsand 
culture. 
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,\rt history in Ascendance 
In the first decade of the 20th century the conceptions of 'typical' 
Africans as uncultured underwent a radical change that influenced how 
African visual-manipulative forms were represented in texts. I am 
referring specifically to the impact of African objects, among others, 
on European artists of the early 20" century. This affected a revaluation 
of African objects in the eyes of European scholars. A pivotal moment 
in Buro-American attitudes towards works of African Culture was the 
Museum of Modem Art's show of African art. The catalogue's essay 
by). ). Sweeney (1935), providing the requisite socia-historical 
background of the show to its viewers, lays bare the tension between 
his discipline and that of the "scholars of African culture," 
anthropologists and ethnolOgists. 
Anthropologists and ethnologists in their works had completely 
overlooked (or at best had only mentioned perfunctorily) the 
aesthetic qualities in the artifacts of primitive peoples . ... It was 
not the scholar who discovered Negro art to European taste but 
the artists. And the artists did so with little more knowledge of 
the objects' provenance or former history than in what junk shop 
they had been lucky enough to find it and whether the dealer 
had a dependable supply. (p. 12) 
Sweeney is certain where the "new" value for African objects resides. 
In the end, however, it is not the tribal characteristics of Negro 
art nor its strangeness that are interesting. It is its plastic qualities. 
Picturesque or exotic features as well as historical and 
ethnographic considerations have a tendency to blind us to its 
lrueworth. (Sweeney). 1935, p.21) 
In short, you do not need the knowledge provided by the scholars on 
Afri . 
can culture to aesthetically appreciate "Negro" art; it is accessible 
III ail Sweeney is certain that the true worth of "Negro" art lies in its 
plulic quali ties. 
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Doubtful that Europeans could ever fully und erstand 
"psychological content" of African art, he was nevertheless aware 
the major obstacle to understanding ' 'black'' African art was the 
prejudice existing tha t denied black Africa any serious contribution 
human civilization. The prejudice Sweeney had to combat assumed 
fact the idea that the person of black African origin was savage, Willh"",. 
history and culture of any sophistication, bereft almost entirely 
intelligence and creativity. Sweeney does his best to contradict 
notions by informing his readers of the great Negro kingdoms, Chana, 
5onghai, and Benin. 
To inform US of the racial and cultural composition of peopiies," 
Africa he relies, nevertheless, on the current categories constructed 
used by the "scholars," the said ones that were blind to the powerful 
aesthetic qualities of Negro African art. Thus Sweeney cOl1ficlently ltella 
us " the population of the African continent may be divided into 
main stocks: Libyan, Hamite, Himyarite (Semite), Negro and B~ 
exclusive of the modern European population and the Indian and 
Chinese introduced by them" (Sweeney, 1935, p. 17). The exlhibiitiOll 
and catalogue did nothing to counter the dominant assumption 
Egypt and North Africa could, indeed should, not be thought of at 
black and African. Black Africa's inscription in other African identities 
could not be recognized; just as the terms Latino or Hispanic tends 10 
make invisible the Afro HispaniC presence in Spanish speaking cu\twes 
of the Americas, so too were the racial categories created to distan'" 
"Negroes" from "civilization." What the elevation of black Africaa 
visual manipulative forms to high value did reinfon::e was the as<:rif'tioI! 
of intuitiveness and emotionality to black persons as an essential trait, 
reserving for white people, men especially, rationality and sellf-e,ontroi. 
For some African intellectuals, typified by the N'egJ'lItLOC 
movement, this was at last recognition of their dilfferent es:senltial 
strength. However, while some black and African artists 
intellectuals may have been elated by such "recognition," some 
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s(ielltists were not. I t is not surprising that it was Diop (1964), a scientist, 
-"" exposed the spurious objectivity and racist motives behind early 
IJIthrOpology's racial categories. 
Such is the opinion of the Frenchman Joseph de Cobineau, 
precursor of Nazi philosophy, who in his famous book On the 
Inequality of Human Races decrees that the artistic sense is 
inSeparable from Negro blood; but he reduces art to an inferior 
manifestation of human nature: ... Frequently Blacks of high 
intellectual attainment remain so victimized by this alienation 
that they seek in all good faith to codify those Nazi ideas in an 
alleged duality of the sensitive, emotional Negro, creator of art, 
and the White Man, especially endowed with rationality. (p.25) 
It was imperative for Diop that black Africans should realize they 
Ill! no less rational, capable of objectivity and science, than any other 
sroup of people. The essentialist apportioning of reason and intuition 
toracial and gender constituencies could only keep black cultures under 
tile supervision of European power. The motivation behind such 
alructures is to make sure that European culture was substantially 
uninfluenced by any other and above all others. Non-European cultures 
_supply raw material, but European culture transforms and elevates 
iL 
The claim that some ineffable quality is added to imported 
techniques, concepts or aesthetic styles often occurs in culturally 
peripheral nations like England, Germany, Japan, Korea or 
Vietnam. Cultural pride needs to be maintained in the face of 
foreign borrowing that is so massive that it cannot be denied, or 
where borrowings run counter to a hierarchy of cultural or 'ra.ciaI' 
sUperiority. (Bemal1988, p.198) 
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Bernal make the above statement in speaking about "uro~ ..... 
perceptions of themselves as the progressive culture. Not SW1'riisin.~ 
for the rational limb of European art, modem criticism and history, 
was the modem European artist who, not as heirs, but as transform"" 
carried forward African knowledge to great new heights, as only 
Europeans could do, not Africans of the old or new worlds. 
The early 20" century texts and the change they represent on 
one hand leave untouched the racial assumptions about Africans, whilt 
on the other they further a positive change in the value of Black African 
visual manipulative objects, but essentially in formalist terms 
would prove unsatisfactory to Afrocentrists and European 
anthropologists. The former seem to have no impact on African art 
hiistory text: hardly ever referred to, they are marginalized. The 
have an increasingly big impact and generally are certain the formalist 
emphasis imposes European meaning on African art, dismissing 
it meant or means to its creators; in other words devaluing their reasons 
for making objects. 
There are several issues we need to be mindful of at this juncture. 
The formalist aesthetic elevates in one way but restricts in another til! 
representations of Africa in art hiistory texts. Also, we should be wary 
of assuming that the polarization of formal against contextual frames 
of interpretation is as necessary as they are represent to be by the 
historians and curators on one hand, and on the other the 
anthropologists who emphasize the social context. Finally, the 
relationship of the "mainstream" to marginalized Afrocentric 
scholarship underscores the different value given to the issues of race 
and rationality, and is itself an undervaluing of African rationality and 
capacity to determine what's in the best interest of Africans. 
Well into the nineteen eighties the status quo on the division of 
African culture into north and south of the Sahara remained in force 
along with its racial categories of justification. About the same time the 
tussle between the hiistorian/ curators and anthropologist had turned 
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JIIOT" favorable to the latter. The formalism of the hiistorian/ curators 
.:eased to be convincing and a new cadre of art historians more 
sytn'p"thetic but not fuJJy converted to the anthropological position 
cBD'e on the scene. They were not all of one persuasion on the north 
SOUth divide, yet were uniform in their substantial exclusion of North 
,tJrican cultures from their texts on African art. 
Willett (1971, p. 109-115), even thought willing to acknowledge 
Ancient Egypt to be perhaps African in the racial sense, and definitely 
to in the cultural sense, was unwilling or perhaps unable to include 
ancient Egypt and North Africa in any substantial way. Six pages out 
01288 are devoted to Egypt, in which the only visual evidence you see 
of Egypt are 3 illustrations of prehistoric art in a text on African art that 
aims to correct misconceptions of African art. Evidently, the 
misconception in most urgent need of correction is the formalist 
exclusion of the cultural context of African art. The value that African 
subjects give to African objects is critical, but th.e attribution of complex 
thought to Africans, which later some ethnolOgist and anthropologist 
were willing to concede, did not necessarily imply, nor secure 
rocognition of equal rationality. Indeed, the assumptions of the childlike 
bTationality of the "primitive" and "tribesman" persisted well into th.e 
latter part of the 20" Century. The following statement from no less an 
authority than E. H. Gombrich (1972) was not only typical, it helped to 
make such attitudes pervasive. 
It is very much as if children played at pirates or detectives till 
they no longer knew where play-acting ended and reality began. 
But with children there is always the grown-up world about them, 
the people who tell them 'Don't be noisy', or 1t is nearly bed-
time' . For the primitive there is no such other world to spoil the 
illusion, because the members of the tribe take part in the 
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ceremonial dances and rites with their fantastic games of pretence. 
They have allieamed their significance from former generations 
and are so absorbed in them thatthey have little chance of stepPing 
outside it and seeing their behavior critically. (p. 23) 
This is from his text The Story of Art now in its sixteenth edition. 
With such attitudes so persistent, to ignore the anxiety of African people 
over the issue of rationality because it was conveniently deemed the 
irrational unscholarly emotional vomit of extreme Afrocentrists, not 
only was a poor excuse, it was symptomatic of insensitivity to African 
feelings on that issue. We have to keep in mind that the institutionalized 
exclusion of Africans of the Americas from opportunities and 
recognition as artists was sustained, at least in part, by a combination 
of the tight tethering of aesthetic notions to race with an apartheid 
hierarchy that used the geographical interval to keep African creativity 
and intelligence potent only "over there" and confined to "back then?" 
Bascom (1973), Brain (1980), Gillon (1991), Seiber and Walker 
(1987) to name a few, sustain the divide by a refusal to include North 
Africa in their texts. Gillon's book, A Short History of African Art, includes 
Nubia, and is quite informative otherwise, but he too keeps North Africa 
and Egypt out. Bascom (1973) does not share Willett's (1971) opinion 
on the place of North Africa in a text on African Art. He is unequivocal; 
'Thevaliclity of excluding Egypt, Ethiopia, North Africa, and the Saban 
is particularly evident in the realm of art. These four areas belong to a 
different world of art and, except in very remote times, the influence 
they have had on sub-Saharan African art has been largely negative" 
(P. 27). This is after he states that "Culturally the affinities of this latge 
region are predominantly to the north and east, rather than to the south' 
(P.27). Brain (1980) is still convinced of the racial categories of the 
imperial era, therefore he can write 
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Among the Bororo Fulani any temptation to settle in villages is 
countered by an intensive propaganda to encourage a confidence 
in the beauty of their way of life, bolstered by a pride in Fulani 
racial characteristics. They have an aesthetic of the body, which 
has helped them retain their particular MedHerranean features 
to a remarkable extent. Young mothers massage the crania of their 
babies as if to model them into the desired shape-a kind of 
elongated sphere. They also manipulate the nose, as if they are 
trying to make it long and thin, giving it an elegant, aristocratic 
(non-Negroid) line with the forehead. (P. 55) 
There are several points we must note. Frrstthere is no distinction 
made between race and ethnicity. This is a conflation quite congruent 
with, but not exclusive to, essentialist ideas that see culture as a 
>genetic" product of racial characteristics; many writers are not carefuJ 
10 make such a distinction recognizing the separate influences of 
somatic and cultural factors in identity construction. Nor is there any 
sense that North and East African cultures, and Middle Eastern ones, 
are racial and ethnic mixtures. How can we account for the persistent 
use of such categories? Eugenia Shanklin (1994) attributes it to silence 
on the issue of race by antlrropologists. 
It was not always the case that antlrropologists dealt summarily 
with the concept of race; from the mid-nineteenth century until 
the 1940's and 1950's, the study of human races preoccupied 
scientists, and many ideas were put forth that we now see as 
erroneous, biased, or bigoted. In the 1960's, the notion of race as 
a valid physical or biological category was denounced by leading 
antlrropologists and, by about 1975, discussions of race had 
disappeaned from most anthropology textbooks. This silence has 
enhanced confusion about a concept that remains current in the 
popular imagination, one often used to justify social and legal 
decisions as if its scientific basis were fully established. (p.1S) 
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The popular imagination referred to certainly includes historians 
African art who continued to use the erroneous, biased and Dl~;Ot.d 
racial categories. Silence on the part of European anthropologists 
complicit with the perpetuation of the categories created by their 
predecessors. But then whose self-esteem was at risk. 
Even more indicative of the inertia of these ideas is the 
translation and publication of Rene Wassing's (1988) African Art: 
background and traditions. Originally published in 1968 in KOltterdarll. 
Wassing's text not only sustains the north south divide, but 
reproduces the racial categories of the 19th century. Amazingly 
deemed a text so important that it was worth reproducing for anlmgful, 
speaking audience? The motivation behind the text, like the aulthOJl1. 
mentioned above, is to place black African art in its cultural corttE'l:t. 
He is at pains to distinguish the African conception of 'artist' from 
"as we know it." Individuals are certainly recognized in African culture 
"but the leitmotiv is function, the purpose of an object, rather than 
standard of criticism founded on purely aesthetic principles, though 
these may not be lacking altogether" (Wassing, 1988, p. 1). 
The "as we know it" Signals the inextricability of the concept "art" 
from Western meaning European and Euro-American dominated social 
contexts. Wassing would have us assume that there is something 
coherent in the concept "art" for Western cultures, when in fact it is 
riddled with contradictions, especially in these latter days in which 
modernist notions have been severely contested by avant-garde 
initiatives to liberate the concept from the turn in meaning given to ft 
by art institutions. The avant-garde's failure and the triumph of 
institutions and the institutional theory expose the real purpose of 
maintaining the term art: since objects in themselves are not art but 
become so by socio-cultural.institutional determination, the important 
question is who will determine which objects and events are deserving 
of the cultural reverence bequeathed by the label art? Those 
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eIIlpowered in this respect are critics, curators, and art historians, the 
wotdsariths in the art business. It is interesting that neither traditional 
,uncan objects, which were not art, nor European ones which are art, 
can do without the mediation of those empowered to designate 
lnCfusion or exclusion from art. That Africans did not have a concept 
01 art (until Europeans came along), and Europeans have an untroubled 
one (or had until Africans came along), is not what is at stake, what is 
at stake is authority to determine value. Once the ordained 
jnsIitutionalized rituals have been performed passage from object to 
art is secured· The demarcation of the difference in this case is more for 
Dl8intaining racial and cultural hierarchy than for telling us about 
African or European visual manipulative objects. 
The resilience of the category "art" can be traced in part to the 
desire to maintain a civilized and superior modem West over Africa, 
lite archetypal antithesis of modern civilization. Hence the need for 
Wassing to remind his readers of how "severely functional" African 
art is, and why "without it's collecti ve cul.tural background it is scarcely 
anderstood"(p.l). This function of the category "art" has not escaped 
the notice of some scholars. McGaffey (I998) referring to the same 
observation made by Mitchel (1986), states in agreement, 
Domestic debates about the nature of art thus implicitly serve to 
defiileour civilization in contrast to others. Art itself has an ambiguous 
position in this play of judgments: although as image it is inferior to, 
and subversive of, the authoritative word, it participates in the 
IlUperiority of our civilization over those, which by definition are 
Incapable of art. Or perhaps we should say art criticism. (p.222) 
McGaffey titles his essay "Magic, or as we usually say, Arl:" A 
Fnrmework for comparing Europeon and African art. That art depends on 
Institutionally sanctioned belief, like the "magic" attributed to primitive 
IJId pre-modem uncivilized societies, has not escaped him. "Art" 
RBCUes European objects so labeled from the derogatory sense of the 
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irrationality associated with the word magic, When attxibuted to 
objects the relation between the art not-art-ness of the objects "'""iUJra 
to remind us all of the hierarchy involved behveen the hvo cuI~ 
and of the basic rationality and irrationality of their members. To 
understand how the interplay of aIt / not-art and rationalityl 
irrationality affects art history texts we must look more clOsely at 
anthropology and the scholars of African art. 
Anthropology and the Mind of Africa. 
Within the field of anthropology there was a desire to know what 
African objects meant to their makers and users. The cultural conlecl 
in wruch they were produced was the focus of anthropological and 
ethnogrnphic investigation. In fact, the anthropologists assumed unlike 
Sweeney that perhaps it is possible to understand the African mind. 
They might have been driven by imperial motives, but it ne',erthelless ' 
resulted in an attempt to understand African culture(s) and in 
better informed about ideas they held. The studies conducted by u~''''' . 
Griaule (1965) and his team is well-known examples of the insight and 
understanding that can be gained from anthropology. But, they axe 
exemplary too of some of its blindness, and have been criticized froOl 
diverse perspectives that include European and African critics. Their 
researches will serve as an occasion for me to examine the issues 
provoked by anthropology and of the uses to wruch it has been put in 
texts on African art history and culture. 
Griaule (1965, and Griaule and Dieterlen, 1986) and his resew 
tearn found that the Dogon and related groups such as the Bamano 
(Bambara) possessed a complex cosmology expressed in a mythology 
that, he and his tearn believed, structured every facet of their existence, 
and therefore could be used to explain the significance of art objects 
and other aspects of the culture of these groups. The basic thrust of the 
criticism of the GriauleSchool as far as its relationship to art is concerned 
is captured very well by Kate Ezra (J 988). 
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To some critics, Griaule's is too idealized a view of Dogan culture, 
lacking the irregularities and texture of realllie. To others, his 
conclusions appeaI to be based on a limited number of Dogon 
collaborators, likeOgotemmeli, whose individual perceptions of 
Dogon culture may not always be shared by others in their ethnic 
group. The Griaule School has been criticized for its lack of 
historical consciousness in treating Dogon society as a timeless, 
unchanging entity. The mythological system described by Griaule 
and Dieterlen may not be the coherent network of 
correspondences they claim it to be, for some readers have found 
internal contradictions and inconsistencies that make the system 
less useful as an interpretive tooL Finally, it has been suggested 
that the literature about the Dogon is more a reflection of the 
thought patterns of the French researchers than of the people being 
studied. (p. 17) 
It is interesting that internal contradictions have been observed and 
(OIISistency demanded in view of the fact tha t there is hard! y a system 
of thought that can claim to be free of inconsistencies, in this case 
whether it is the interpretations of Gnaule or his informants. And 
certainly plmality itself will make for inconsistency and divergence. 
More reasonable is the criticism of a lack of historical consciousness. In 
fact, just as Ezra essentially points to the modernist Eurocentric bias of 
Griaule, so too one can discern in her quote the "postmodem" 
preoccupation with plmaJity of social VOices, historicity, and European 
selfcriticism operating to acknowledge shortCOmings, but also to affirm 
and sustain the impression of a strong stream of reflexivity in European 
academic traditions, by which it justifies its claim to objective 
superiority. Nevertheless, there is something quite "modern" in the 
p<lStmodern desire of Griaule's critics to capture "the irregularities and 
lextures of realllie." If one can see and feel in Ezra's statement the 
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liberating arm of ever more seIi-<:onscious European scholarshiP-by 
which it obscures its subjection to its own collective mentality-th." 
in contrast the African person and the meaning of her/ his visual 
manipulative objects remain limited to village and communal contexts; 
limited to the past One does not yet see or feel the African subject as 
any more reflexive and self-determinative than before, rather the 
African subject is the object of another network of concepts and irames, 
more subtle perhaps, but with no risk of African will behind the reasons. 
no glance forward, except unwittingly in unwitting forms. We can get 
a sense of this interaction of past and present if we turn to one of Ezra's 
sources of criticism of Griaule, Paulin Hountonji (1983). 
Hountonji's critique of Griaule is part of his critique of 
anthropology in Africa, and is situated in his castigation of it and some 
of his fellow African intellectuals for perpetrating a deception, a myth; 
namely that what has been offered by traditional informants, or worse 
yet, has been distilled from them by western mediators such as Placade 
Temples (1969), is African philosophy. Hountonji is scathing in his 
dismissal of the latter; they not on! yare Western constructions of African 
philosophy, but reinforce the notion that Africans cannot distill the main 
concepts of their philosophies themselves, Europeans have to do it for 
them. In Temples' intervention the African person is still unconscious 
of the philosophy he/ she embodies and lives. Articulation of its 
principles is a task to be taken up by a more disciplined mind, the 
paternal European one. Griaule's attitude is better, but still imbued 
with superiority; and still does not accord his informant the dignity of 
individuality. Rather, Griaule's informant, Ogotemmeli, is the 
mouthpiece of a communal mind, a mere spokesman of a mass mind: 
the Dogon mind, African mentality. 
Ogotemmeli can elaborate on an African perspective, but it is 
not his liberated reason surveying history and ideas and arriving at 
revisions. For Hountonji (1983) philosophy is a process of engagement 
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with historical reality resulting in a continuous revision and expansion 
of ideas similar to science. This "self reflexivity" and historicity that is 
t/te universal characteristic of philosophy is not what Ogotenuneli 
offerS, but he is an individual elucidating a religious system. And 
aysrernsin Hountonji's estimation are impervious to development. How 
should we regard Ogoternmeli? As a theologian? Yes. As a philosopher? 
No. 
One can question Hountonji' s assumption that all Ogotemmeli 
haS done is elaborate a static view. Having insisted that Ogoternmeli is 
an individual, can we be sure that he has not given his spin on a more 
general perspective? After all, one of the criticisms of Griaule is that he 
relied on a limited number of informants, the implication being that 
others may have had different perspectives on Dogon cosmology. 
Regardless of such reservations Hountonji' s anxiety is for an African 
individuality that is marked by a critical rationality. It is manifested in 
his determination not to fool himself or his fellow Africans as to what 
philosophy really is (even if one questions his restriction of philosophy 
to a European form, rational speculation) and in his certainty that 
Africans must develop, must recover perhaps after a long interval, 
science and philosophy. This desire is manifested in Hountonji's 
sympathy for Diop's (1974) project of excavating a scientific African 
tradition from ancient Egypt. This anxiety for an African science and 
philosophy, and for an individuality and society recognized in those 
terms is not the deep concern of anthropology and its postrnodern 
fascination with plurality and difference. The latter is still concerned 
with the (very modern) project of understanding and representing more 
faithfully the Other, hence the critique of Griaule's method as unable 
to capture "the irregularities and texture of real life." What is critical is 
that the interest of the African person in countering the stereotype of 
irrationality and superstition finds very limited, if any, presence in 
available texts. If the modernist tendency regards non-European culture, 
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and particularly African culture as raw material to be translated 
the higher denominations of European cultural currency, dis,reg;ard;" 
and denigrating African reflexivity as integral to its culture, 
postmodernist scholarship, even if more sensitive to A IT;" __ 
personhood, nevertheless skirts the issue of African reflexivity as 
is irrelevant to the issue of African art. 
Representations of Africa go through at least two phases. 
there is the specialist of African art who, focused on a specific 
group or culture, has already filtered and distilled information 
other sources to be incorporated into his/ her argument. Then 
are the general texts that draw on thespecia\ist, indeed, rely on editorial 
panels drawn from the ranks of the specialist. It is not difficult to 
how aU the institutional reins on what qualifies as academically 
objective studies are profoundly linked to the modem European 
to enSure that it retains authority over what is acceptable kn,Jw:led, ... 
Outside these two moments is that occupied by African scholars 
often trained in European universities, are also constrained by the 
norms. But, besides that they, like reflective persons in any cuJtuN" 
have to sift "real" knowledge from the spurious. 
The focus in academia is on what visual manipulative works mesa 
in the narrow context of anthropology. In studies of Western art 
will find books ranging from Art and Physics, (Shlain, 1991), to 
Theory of the Avant-garde, (1984). African visual manipulative 
are not approached in a similar way. There is limited use of AtnOiD. 
interpretive theories as may be found in divination or other Drl'cti,i>!S. 
A similar situation would not happen with Chinese art, where it 
not be out of place to use interpretive ideas structuring the I Ching. 
a nutshell, the range of interpretive strategies applied to African 
manipulative forms is limited; therefore the "mind" generating 
seems limited, especially compared to Europe or Asia . Who 
constrained the meaning of African visual manipulative forms in 
way other than those who authorize the texts on African art. 
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The confluence of the narrow focus with nationalist tendencies 
WOrked not only against diffusionist tendencies that would derive 
IJIYIhing profound in Africa from ancient Egypt, but also against pan-
AfriC'U' tendencies generally. It is also runs counter to more generalized 
jeYeIs of meaning, and is more congruent with the interest of having a 
..,ore "textured" view of African culture. DeMott (1979), for example, 
deD"Onstrates the inadequacy of Criaule and his school's attempt to 
explain the meaning of Dogon sculpture exclusively via mythology. 
She resolves the claims of mythology, iconic images, and performed 
jjtUaI, especially the former, by allowing for interplay of the three. This 
was justifiably corrective of the over application of mythology as an 
explanatory instrument. However, nowhere in her text does DeMott 
JD8Ition the astronomical information for which the mythology was a 
....,taphor. That information indeed points to a tradition of thought 
grounded in observation of reality (even if that reality has not all been 
amfirmed by modern science). It leads one beyond the stereotypes of 
IUP"'Stition associated with animism, ancestors, the supernatural, and 
..... gic," and is indicative of a more general African possession of that 
kind of knowledge. There is little doubt that Dogon astronomical 
knowledge profoundly impressed Criaule (1965) and his fellow 
researchers (), and that he was convinced that these seemingly simple 
people were possessed of profound knowledge linked to ancient African 
and European traditions, which he called "Mediterranean" traditions, 
It would seem, therefore, that the Zodiac of the Mediterranean 
peoples could be explained from the point of view of Dogon 
cosmology and metaphysic. But the European [Criaulel had no 
illusions about how such an argument was likely to be received 
by recognized specialists in academic circles . . .. Has it not been 
established once for all that the African has nothing to give, no 
contribution to make, that he cannot even re.flect ancient forms of 
the world's thought? Has he not always been relegated to the 
level of a slave? (p.215) 
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Yet this astronomical knowledge is left out of DeMolt's SPEtiai; .. 
text, and also never finds a place in general texts on African art 
otherwise. Why? The distance between black Africa anct 
"Mediterranean" cultures must be maintained at all costs. The mod"", 
"Aryan Model" (Bernal, 1988, p.ll did it by denying any influence 01 
Egypt on Greece. More recent anthropology and archeology's bias for 
indigenism, and postmodern emphases on plurality and differenct 
arrive at a similar end through sympathy for nationalist tendencieo 
and by downplaying-even dismissing pan-African suggestions. 
Masolo (1994, pp. 68-83), an example of one of the "otherwise," leaves 
Dogon astronomical knowledge out of his text on African philOSOphy 
in which he discusses Dogon ideas, He sticks quite safely to the 
metaphysical ideas but never refers to the astronomical informatien to 
which they are related. Most academics, European or African, do not 
want to look stupid by siding with something so incredulous as a 
"primitive" tribe of Africans having astronomical knowledge that 
modern science has only recently arrived at. Such concerns are not stull 
"on the ground" as a bias for historicity may prefer, being mere 
concerned with ideas. Rather, it is "too" up in the air and to that extent 
ungrounded and unreal. What is critical then, is not so much the 
meanings that Dogon mythology and objects can hold, but the sense of 
effrontery to the ego of Western science and civilization that they may 
present. Because it is unwise to trouble this ego, effectively guarded by 
a very dubious objectivity, Dogon astronomical information is filtered 
out of art texts. 
There is also the unwillingness to accept the coexistence of science 
and religion together in African contexts, in an equation different to 
the estranged one that was imperative to European progress. A similar 
attitude is directed toward all non-European traditions of scientific 
knowledge, whether it is the science of yoga in India or concepts of the 
nchi" force in Far Eastern traditions. African cultures are far more 
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JllSC"ptible to European tendencies to dismiss their knowledge as 
lJIISCientifiC than those of India and the Far East because generally 
infonnation is oral, without a textual tradition. 
How can such information be irrelevant to the "meaning" the 
dances, masks, and rituals hold for Dogon culture, and from them for 
African cultures generally? Space suits, panels with lights and buttons, 
(OIIIlote and symbolize to any viewer the scientific knowledge and 
related space expleration that is the achievement of modern science. 
What has determined that African visual manipulative works cannot 
have that kind of range of meaning? Only the peculiar kind ofebjectivity 
that will not acknowledge scientific thought to nen-European traditions. 
Therefo.re, the impressio.n that must prevail about Africa and African 
peoples, which the mediating schelar has decided is truer, is of a 
superstitio.US people with fantastic mythologies that have no. ground 
in reality. 
Others have been critical of the narrowness o.f frames used by art 
histo.rianS. In a review o.f a Bamana exhibitio.n and catalogue Sarah 
lIrett-Smith (2002), while complementing the contrihutions to the 
catalogue, is of the epinion tha t failure to take into account the practice 
of slavery in Africa's past not only gives a distorted view of the past, 
but also. reduces the significance of objects. 
The problem with the ahistorical viewpoint from which most of 
the otherwise excellent contributions to this book suffer is not 
just that it provides us with a sanitized picture of the African past, 
but also that on a purely intellectual plane it may stop us from a 
truly profound understanding of the Po.werful o.bjects in this 
exhibition, and the creative inventio.n and risk taking to. which 
they are a witness. (P. 942) 
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Such is the way meaning shifts within frames, and from one frame to 
another, and expands to cumulative value when diverse frames he14 
together lift an object from banal and limited meaning to complex and 
profound value. Just as information about African slavery makes I 
difference to the meaning of Bamana objects, so too would DogOll 
astronomical knowledge make a difference to how any reader regilrd& 
Dogon objects. The expansion to frames other than the art historical or 
anthropological clearly is necessary if we are not to be left with restricted 
notions of meaning for African visual manipulative objects. 
Conclusion 
What forces delayed the writing of texts that included the arts of 
African continent as a whole? The most powerful drag on change is 
the deeply and subUy embedded assumptions generated by European 
imperialism and global dominance. This is true of racial categories, as 
wellas through the use of the category "art." The assumed superiority 
of European science above all others in every respect, serves to keep 
the range of interpretive frames from which art historical texts view 
African cultures in narrow bounds. It is a modem presumption that 
others did not reach where European science has reached today, 
contradicted by confirma tions by the said science of things propounded 
by non-European traditions. A confluence of the national identity 
interests of African states and cultures with trends in anthropology 
and archeology biased toward indigenous development overshadows 
pan-African aspects. Ironically, even in this postmodern moment that 
sees culture as a collage. the overly organic concept of culture persists, 
so that cultures cannot be seen to "meet" or coincide in terms of ideas 
in moments of similarity that transcend time and space. These are the 
forces that delayed the vision of African culture we are now seeing. 
That the recent general texts on African art finally acknowledge 
the continent as a whole, its diversity, difference, and plurality, thatH 
is multiracial and multicultural, indeed ancienUy so, is a step forward. 
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It promiseS to be a trend that will take texts out of the old formulas of 
~tation of African cultures. A sad aspect of these changes is that 
",any of those who battled against those norms we now see displaced, 
are labeled simply Afrocentricist, and major concerns articulated by 
I/Ieffi for all people of African origin have not been properly addressed 
by any of the texts including the recent ones, especially those related to 
-civiJiZation" and black Africans. 
New dilemmas will emerge. Ruth Phillips' (2002) review of three 
exhibitions of African art signals what the "new" dilemmas are like. 
The key point she made that is relevant to my argument is captured in 
the following quote: 
Under colonialism, and even more after its formal ending, the 
West has been exporting museums and their technologies of 
representation as integral parts of modernity' s achieving, 
memorializing, and nation building practices .. . What these three 
exhibitions show, then, is how successfully museological 
conventions have been exported and, to some extent, translated, 
so that now, in the era of globalization, museum savvy can be 
reimported to the "mother countries" through collaborative 
curatorial processes (p.951). 
Phillips tends to see only how Western culture successfully dominates 
others, even subUy in so-called post-colonial postmodern times. While 
there is truth to that, what is also true is the subtle influence of the 
others on the West, and this subUe influence remains unrecognized 
and unacknowledged. The terms postmodern and postcolonial are too 
linear to accommodate the fact that different cultures had arrived at 
6Iructurally similar realizations at different times. What is needed are 
studies of the subUe influences of the others on European and Eurn-
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American thought; and of how others, in this case people of Africa and 
its Diaspora, are incorporating European ideas and reinterpreting thOse 
derived from their own traditions. 
Of the two texts that have dealt with the African continent as l 
whole, Africa: the art of a Omnnellt is not without its critics. Rankin anq 
Uebhammer (1996) for example regard it as perpetuating ahistOriCi\! 
notions of African visual manipulative forms and of keeping in place 
Eurocentric notions of the civilizational priority of North African 
cultures. Yet, the fact that prior texts seem to accept the exclusion of 
North African cultures from Africa makes such an inclusion a sign of 
progress. On the other hand, the narrow interpretive &ames uses by 
art historians makes the Eurocentric priority given to North African 
cultures, result not only from persistent ideas about cultural hierarchy, 
bu t also &om the failure to see deeper connections between them and 
African cultures south of the Sahara which the use of mOTe diverse 
frames would have facilitated. The lingering problem of "priority" 
based on racial or cultural difference cannot be resolved by simply 
flipping around the emphasis &om south to north and visa versa, nor 
by affirmations of plurality and difference fashionable in this 
postrnodern moment, but requires a more complex use of diverse 
&ames of interpretation to allow the complexity of African culture to 
be seen, It will also allow the cOgnitive side of A&ican objects to stand 
beside the emotive one, allow a morerich aesthetic to prevail, and dispel 
the notions of African irrationality that persist. What is needed above 
all is more writing about African visual manipulative forms by Africans 
&om diverse perspectives, for this is why one never thinks about 
European objects in limited frames, their producers and consumers 
have viewed them from many perspectives. 
There are also questions art educators have to ask themselves. 
Have we been critical enough of the assumptions of anthropology and 
African art history? Are we perpetuating myths about African visual 
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lI'ampulative objects? Have we taken sufficient account of the impact 
of non-Western cultures on the West? A deeper understanding of African 
visUal manipulative traditions will offer insights that we art educators 
have overlooked because we are still working from within contexts 
that are limited. Given the move in such academic projects as material 
culture studies, and the thesis by BUrger (1984) and Huyssen (1986) 
that the avant-garde was a drive within Europe to reconnect art with 
life, how can we maintain such an unbridgeable gulf between African 
visUal manipulative traditions and European ones? A related problem 
is the notion that African art is almost all religious, any notion that 
science is involved is suppressed, as it would seem to fly in the face of 
mainStream science. It may be that art educators will need to be less 
restrictive than their historian and anthropolOgist colleagues in seeking 
perspectives from which to interpret Africa's visual manipulative 
traditions, objects and practices. Also, the failure to take into account 
African anxieties related to rationality not only contributes to the 
persistence of "aesthetic" emphases in African art exhibitions and texts, 
but to the perpetuation of a condescending portrayal of objectivity and 
rationality in African culture, in which the "difference" in African 
objectivity is more often than not a euphemism for irrationality. The 
stakes involved are too high for people of African descent, and all others, 
for art educators to ignore. 
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